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COMMENTS 
CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS-FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP IN 
SALE OF CONTROLLING STOCK INTEREST-The sale of controlling 
blocks of corporate stock is a common commercial phenomenon in 
this era of increased corporate diversification. Usually the pur-
chaser deals with an agent representing stockholders owning a 
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numerical majority of the voting stock. But with ever-broadening · 
corporate ownership, coupled with natural apathy and the practical 
impossibility of obtaining full stockholder vote, control is increas-
ingly falling to minority blocks.1 This comment is concerned with 
the duty owed by the controlling stockholders -to the non-con-
trolling stockholders when there is a sale of the controlling interest. 
Recently this question was considered by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Perlman v. Feldmann,2 and 
the opinion, reversing the lower court and accompanied by a 
vigorous dissent by Judge Swan, deserves careful consideration. 
I. 
While no attempt will be made to analyze all the information 
presented to the lower court, 3 the pertinent facts can be sum-
marized as follows: F was dominant stockholder, chairman of the 
board of directors, and president of N Corporation, which pro-
duced steel sheet to be sold to manufacturers of steel products. 
During the conflict in Korea, when steel was in short supply, F, 
acting as agent for the controlling stock interests of N Corporation, 
entered into a sale of this block of stock to W Company, a syndicate 
comprised of end-users of steel who wished to obtain a dependable 
source of supply in the tight market. The sale price received ~or this 
controlling stock exceeded both its market value and its book value.4 
In times of normal demand for steel, N Corporation, because of its 
old facilities, could compete with more modern mills only in its im-
mediate geographic area, while the purchasing syndicate repre-
sented geographically remote end-users. The court held that, 
while the majority stockholders could normally dispose of their 
stock without having to account for profits, the fiduciary nature 
of the majority's relation to the minority required that they share 
any value received that represented a sale by them of a corporate 
asset. The asset which the majority was said to have appropriated 
was the power of the corporation to gain an unusually large pre-
mium for its product by controlling the p~oduct's allocation in a 
1 The courts do not distinguish benveen majority control and minority controlling 
interests, but talk strictly in terms of majority and minority stock. Perlman v. Feldmann, 
(2d Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 173. See Rohrlich, "Suits in Equity by Minority Stockholders 
as a Means of Corporate Control," 81 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 692 (1933). 
2 (2d Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 173. 
3 There were, in all, one hundred and thirty-one findings of fact listed in the first 
twenty pages of Judge Hincks' opinion. (D.C. Conn. 1952) 129 F. Supp. 162. 
4 The controlling stock was purchased for $20 per share, the book value was $17.03, 
and the price in over-the-counter sales had been found not to exceed $12 per share. 
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time of sho:r:t supply. The case was remanded to the district court 
to determine what value the controlling stock would have had, 
shorn of its appurtenant control over the allocation of the corpora-
tion's output. The difference between this figure and the sale 
price of the stock was to be awarded pro-rata to the minority stock-
holders of record at the time of the sale. 
II. 
The majority stockholders are not bound to a fiduciary relation-
ship with the minority merely by virtue of their ownership of 
stock.5 The courts have placed this restriction on the majority 
only when they have assumed the character of managers, i.e., when 
they have been speaking for and determining the policies of the 
corporation.6 In taking upon themselves the power and preroga-
tives of directors, the majority acts for the corporation as a whole, 
and so are bound by the same fiduciary relation to the minority 
that directors hold toward all the stockholders.7 Thus, when the 
controlling stockholders deal with the corporation, purchasing 
from it or selling to it, they have the burden not only to prove the 
good faith of the transaction but must also establish its inherent 
fairness as to the corporation.8 This is not to be confused with 
the personal disinterest demanded of the directot'-the majority 
stockholders may vote on a contract in which they have a personal 
interest separate from the corporation if, in their discretion, such 
a transaction would be in the best interests of the corporation.10 
The fiduciary duty concept is applied only to hold that the majority 
cannot use their controlling power to injure the corporation or the 
minority interests.11 Based upon this, there is an undisputed rule 
that the majority, in exercising their power to control corporate 
5 Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 517 (1942). 
6 Chounis v. Laing, 125 W. Va. 275, 23 S.E. (2d) 628 (1942); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh 
Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876). 
7 Allied Chemical &: Dye Corp. v. Steel &: Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 
486 (1923). 
s Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238 (1939); Meyerhoff v. Bankers' Securities, 
Inc., 105 N.J.Eq. 76, 147 A. 105 (1929); 16 L.R.A. (n.s.) 892 (1908). 
9 Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36; Irving Trust Co. v. 
Deutsch, (2d Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 121, cert. den. 294 U.S. 708, 55 S.Ct. 405 (1935). 
10 Baker v. Standard Lime &: Stone Co., 203 Md. 270, 100 A. (2d) 822 (1953); Bjorn-
gaard v. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483, 52 N.W. 48 (1892); Chicago Hansom Cab 
Co. v. Yerkes, 141 Ill. 320, 30 N.E. 667 (1892). 
11 Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., (7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 369, cert. den. 316 U.S. 675, 
62 S.Ct. 1045 (1942). 
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business, must act in the interest of all stockholders when making 
sales of corporate property,12 and the minority may not.be excluded 
from a fair participation in the profits from the sale.13 
III. 
The general rule as to sale of stock is that every stockholder, 
including a majority stockholder, is free to dispose of his shares at 
any time and for any price to which he may agree without being 
liable to other stockholders, as long as he does not dominate, inter-
fere with or mislead the others in exercising the same rights.14 
However, certain limitations have been imposed upon the holders 
of majority or controlling interests in favor of the minority.15 
It is constructively fraudulent for the majority to induce the 
minority to sell its interest, either to a majority stockholder or to a 
third person, for a great deal less than that received by the major-
ity.16 The majority cannot fraudulently scheme with a purchaser 
to depress the value of corporate stock and thus enable the acquisi-
tion of the minority interest at less than its value.17 Nor can the 
majority remain wholly oblivious to the best interests of the cor-
poration; it may not purposely or negligently sell its control to 
parties intending to loot18 or mismanage19 the corporation. Public 
policy may also restrain a sale of majority interest where such a 
sale would create a monopoly or prevent competition.20 
The essential thing in these restraints on alienation of majority 
interests is that the tests applied are those of good faith and reason-
able care. Without proof of bad faith, intent to defraud, or neg-
ligence on the part of the majority, the minority stockholders 
have no cause of action merely because of a sale by the majority of 
12 13 AM. JUR., Corporations §427 (1938). The same rule was applied to sales of 
corporate assets during dissolution in Kaye v. Kentucky Public Elevator Co., 295 Ky. 
661, 175 S.W. (2d) 142 (1943). 
13 Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 39 S.Ct. 533 (1919): Soderstrom v. 
Kungsholm Baking Co., (7th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 1008. 
14 Roby v. Dunnett, (10th Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 68; Barnes v. Brown, 80 N.Y. 527 
(1880); 13 Fl.ETCHER, CYC. CORP. §5805 (1943). 
15 Stick.ells, "Stockholders' Duty in Sale of Stock,'' 31 BoST. UNIV. L. REv. 191 (1951). 
16 The test is one of good faith. See 132 A.L.R. 260 (1941). 
17 Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Committee v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 
(C.C. D.C. 1948) 173 F. (2d) 416. 
18 Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 22, noted 
in 25 MINN. L. REv. 525 (1941). 
19 See Hunnewell v. New York Central & H.R.R. Co., (C. C. N.Y. 19ll) 196 F. 543. 
20 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Commonwealth, (Pa. 1886) 7 A. 368; 13 AM. JUR., Corpora• 
tions §430 (1938). 
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its controlling interest.21 The mere fact that the majority receives 
a premium price for its stock is no fraud on the minority.22 It 
is a recognized fact that a controlling interest is of greater value 
than a minority interest,23, and certainly investors can take into 
consideration the value of the power to appoint the management 
of a corporation.24 One court sums up this matter of price_ in this 
way: 
"No court could control the prices at which the . . . 
[majority] ... stockholders should sell their stock. That 
obviously was a matter of private contract between the 
parties thereto. As to such arrangement the minority 
interests cannot be heard to complain, absent, as we 
have said, fraud, overreaching, or deceit."25 
IV. 
In Perlman v. Feldmann, the majority stockholders were held 
liable to the minority because in selling their controlling interest 
they also sold an asset of the corporation, the proceeds from which 
they were bound to share. The court concluded that the power 
to allocate the product in a period of short supply was an asset; 
this was essential to holding the majority liable. But if this con-
trol were viewed simply as any other corporate power inherent 
in the majority interest, the minority would have a cause of action 
only if the power were abused,26 and that action would have to be 
against the new majority of shareholders who abused it, not against 
the old majority who had sold their control. The minority lost 
no more through the sale than if the original majority had stayed 
in control and had, in their discretion, allocated the products of 
the corporation in a way contrary to the desires of the minority.27 
The minority would have had to go along unless they could have 
shown bad faith or lack of due diligence on the part of the man-
agers.2e Thus, even assuming that the allocation of steel to geo-
graphically remote end-users was an abuse of a corporate power 
21 Hallenborg v. Cobre Grande Copper Co., 200 U.S. 239, 26 S.Ct. 236 (1906); Adams 
v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Ok.la. 461, 179 P. (2d) 147 (1947); Smith v. Gray, 50 
Nev. 56, 250 P. 369 (1926). 
22 Levy v. American Beverag!! Corp., note 5 supra. 
23 Tryon v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P. (2d) 251 (1951). 
24 Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N.J.Eq. S73, 53 A. 842 (1903). 
25 Nelson v. Northland Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 151 at 156, 266 N.W. 857 (1936). 
2613 AM. JUR., Corporations §1014 (1938). 
27 Roosevelt v. Hamblin, 199 Mass. 127, 85 N.E. 98 (1908). 
28 Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, (6th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 389; Hill v. Erwin Mills, 
Inc., 239 N.C. 437, 80 S.E. (2d) 358 (1954); Kroener v. Pancoast, 47 R.I. 470, 134 A. 6 
(1926); 51 YALE L. J. 1034 (1942). 
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to the detriment of the minority, the original majority did not 
abuse this power, and only the purchasers should be liable. Also, 
no duty should be placed upon the majority to account to the 
corporation for profits from the sale of their stock simply because 
they were in a position, due to favorable market conditions, to 
command a considerable premium above current market prices.29 
In deciding that the power to control allocation of the corporate 
product was an asset and not simply a power, the court faced the 
seemingly impossible task of trying to separate the amount of 
premium received based upon the power to control the corpora-
tion in general from the amount received based upon the ultimate 
power to control" distribution. It is also important to note that 
in future applications of this complicated test, the court must first 
check the relative supply and demand in the industry, and find 
that the market for the corporation's product was a seller's market, 
or else the power to control allocation of a product could hardly 
be considered a valuable asset. The result in Perlman v. Feldmann 
might well be just, but the court has created an extremely unwieldy 
doctrine which opens all sales of controlling blocks of stock to the 
uncertainty that the courts, on hindsight, might decide that part 
of the control sold was an asset of the corporation, the proceeds 
from which belonged to all the shareholders equally. 
Morton A. Polster, S.Ed. 
29 Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y.S. 221 (1931); Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 
427, 91 A. 428 (1914). 
